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Gideon v. Wainwright a Half Century Later
CHASING GIDEON: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR POOR PEOPLE’S JUSTICE.
By Karen Houppert. New York, New York: The New Press, 2013.
288 pages. $26.95.

Reviewed by Yale Kamisar*
On May 23, 2013, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the public
defender’s office serving the state’s largest judicial district (the MiamiDade County public defender’s office, sometimes called PD-11) could
withdraw from assigned cases or decline to take new ones.1 The reason was
that a crushing caseload prevented the defender’s office from adequately
representing indigent criminal defendants.2
As a result, observed the Florida Supreme Court, public defenders
routinely “juggle” cases in a crude “triage,” focusing on the most serious
cases to the detriment of other clients.3 Various witnesses also testified that
typically
[t]he assistant public defender meets the defendant for the first time
at arraignment during a few minutes in the courtroom or hallway and
knows nothing about the case except for the arrest form provided by
the state attorney, yet is expected to counsel the defendant about the
State’s plea offer. In this regard, the public defenders serve “as mere
conduits for plea offers.” . . . The witnesses also testified that the
attorneys almost never visited the crime scenes, were unable to
properly investigate or interview witnesses themselves, often had
other attorneys conduct their depositions, and were often unprepared
to proceed to trial when the case was called. Thus, the circumstances
presented here involve some measure of nonrepresentation and
therefore a denial of the actual assistance of counsel guaranteed by
Gideon and the Sixth Amendment.4
More than a few people are likely to be surprised, even shocked, by the
sorry condition of Florida’s public defender’s office. But not anyone who

* Clarence Darrow Distinguished University Professor Emeritus of Law, University of
Michigan; Professor Emeritus of Law, University of San Diego.
1. Pub. Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 282–83 (Fla. 2013). The
state supreme court held that the public defender’s office could do so if circumstances, since the
case was originally brought, “still warrant[ed] granting the Public Defender’s motion to decline
appointments in future third-degree felony cases under the standards approved in this decision.”
Id. at 264–65.
2. Id. at 273–74.
3. Id. at 274.
4. Id. at 278.
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has read Karen Houppert’s new book: Chasing Gideon: The Elusive Quest
for Poor People’s Justice.5
As Ms. Houppert observes:
Ironically, one of the areas hardest hit by . . . [the] failure of the
indigent defense system to keep pace with the demand for
representation . . . is in Gideon’s home state of Florida. There, the
crisis in the overburdened courts reached epic proportions in the last
decade. The chief public defender in Miami, struggling with
massive caseloads, fell on his sword a few years back, sacrificing his
job and reputation by refusing to accept more cases.
....
. . . Starting with Bennett Brummer, [Miami-Dade County’s] chief
public defender for thirty-two years until 2009, and now continuing
with Carlos Martinez, chief public defender since then, PD-11 has
fought to reduce its excessive caseloads, which since 2004 began
steadily climbing and by 2008 crept as high as seven-hundred-plus
[felony] cases a year for some assistant public defenders.
....
. . . [Various] organizations advise a maximum of 150 noncapital
felony cases per public defender, per year. Meanwhile, a Florida
governor’s commission on public defense set a maximum standard of
100 felony cases per lawyer per year while the Florida Public
Defenders’ Association recommends 200 cases.
No one says seven hundred cases per attorney is okay. And that,
Brummer says, is the insane level at which public defenders in his
office were expected to work.6
When he was nearing the end of his distinguished career, one of my
former law professors observed that a dramatic story of a specific case “has
the same advantages that a play or a novel has over a general discussion of
ethics or political theory.”7 Ms. Houppert illustrates this point in her very
first chapter.8

5. KAREN HOUPPERT, CHASING GIDEON: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR POOR PEOPLE’S JUSTICE
(2013). The book was published shortly before the Florida Supreme Court ruling, discussed supra
notes 1–4 and accompanying text.
6. HOUPPERT, supra note 5, at 91–94.
7. ELLIOT EVANS CHEATHAM, A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED 22 (1963).
8. The primary heading of the chapter, “Due Process Theater,” is based on comments made by
public defender Carol Dee Huneke. HOUPPERT, supra note 5, at 3, 25. After highlighting the fact
that she and other public defenders are under enormous pressure to persuade clients to plead
guilty, and noting that “a lot of ills are hidden by bad plea bargains,” Huneke adds: “It’s like due
process theater . . . . People are dressed up like lawyers and they’re standing next to a client, but
they are not really zealously advocating” because they have too many cases to handle, and they
simply do not have the time. Id.
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Houppert is a good storyteller. And she writes with power and style.
In the first chapter she tells a story about two Washington state public
defenders: Douglas Anderson, who represented a twelve-year-old boy
charged with the sexual molestation of a neighboring five-year-old; and
Carol Dee Huneke, who represented an eighteen-year-old charged with
vehicular homicide.9
Anderson was an overworked, indeed, overwhelmed public defender,
who just seemed to be going through the motions. Huneke was also
overworked, but she was highly motivated and quite effective.
When A.N.J., as he is called in the book, was charged with sexually
molesting a much younger boy, his public defender, Anderson (who had
over 200 other child criminal cases that year, plus another 200 abuse or
neglect cases) urged the boy and his parents to plead guilty, thereby getting
a reduction to a lesser felony. When asked by the boy’s parents whether
their son would always be labeled a “sex offender,” Anderson assured them
that the label would, or could, be removed at some point, but he admitted
that he did not really know when. He promised to get back to the parents
on this matter—but never did. The boy pled guilty. The boy and his
parents soon learned, however, that once there was a guilty plea the child
molestation conviction would never come off the records.10
Anderson made no motions. He filed no pleadings. He interviewed no
witnesses. He hired no investigators—perhaps because money to pay for
one would come from the flat fee he was paid by the county for
representing indigent clients. Even Anderson admitted that the arrangement
he had with the county “creates a disincentive” for him to hire investigators.
This may explain why, although he had more than 200 juvenile offense
cases the year he represented A.N.J., Anderson did not hire an investigator
for any of them.11
It was only after A.N.J. pled guilty that his parents learned, to their
dismay, that their son’s record as a sex offender would never be expunged.
Moreover, a monitor was likely to put the boy under daily surveillance for
many years.12
9. Id. at 5–6, 16.
10. Id. at 16–19.
11. Id. at 18–19. When it comes to legal aid for indigent defendants, there are some hard
questions that cannot be avoided. But the flat-fee arrangement, which may have led Anderson not
to hire a single investigator for the entire year, is not one of them. It should be prohibited.
Moreover, Anderson did not consult a single expert or hire a single one to testify that year.
Once again, the reason may have been that the money would have come from the public
defender’s “own pocket.” Id. at 19.
Still another arrangement should be noted and prohibited. As Houppert observes,
“[b]ecause many flat-fee attorneys also continue in private practice, where they charge paying
clients hourly fees, flat-fee defenders are also incentivized to serve their paying clients at the
expense of the indigent clients.” Id. at 32.
12. Id. at 19–20.
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A.N.J.’s parents turned to two local attorneys in an attempt to overturn
their son’s guilty plea.13 They finally succeeded—six years later! At that
time, the state’s highest court ruled that the performance of A.N.J.’s courtappointed counsel had been so pitiful that his client would be allowed to
withdraw his guilty plea.14
The other Washington state case Houppert discusses in the first
chapter involves eighteen-year-old Sean Replogle, who was involved in a
car accident. When the elderly driver of the other car (Lowell Stack) died
in the hospital some days later, the state raised the charge against Replogle
to vehicular homicide.15
Because of her excessive caseload, Replogle’s public defender, Carol
Dee Huneke, asked for a continuance. At first, the trial judge denied it. But
Huneke battled on.16
She got co-workers to submit signed affidavits to the effect that she
had been working in the office nearby every Saturday, Sunday, and holiday.
She also pointed out that the public defenders were “extremely
outnumbered” by prosecutors. As a result, the prosecutors had little
incentive to plea bargain. On further reflection, the trial judge decided to
grant Huneke a three-week extension.17
The extension gave Huneke time to hire an expert to investigate the
accident in order to recreate it for the jury. Her investigator soon
discovered that the state’s expert “had doubled the length of the skid marks
to do his speed-distance calculations.”18
Once Huneke took the time and trouble to find out more about how the
driver of the other car had died, the so-called homicide turned out to be
nothing of the sort. The driver of the other car had not died from injuries
suffered in the accident but from an infection that had occurred after
surgery had been performed to fix a hernia. As the victim’s family
physician told Huneke when she interviewed him (and as he subsequently
told the jury), the emergency room doctors had never notified him that they
were planning to perform surgery on the driver of the other car. If they had
done so, the family physician would have strongly objected.19
After all, the hernia had not been bothering the patient for a long time.
Moreover, considering the patient’s advanced age and fragile condition, a

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 39.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 29–30, 36.
Id. at 38.
Id.
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hernia operation was a poor option because it might kill the patient.20 Of
course, as it turned out, it did.
When Ms. Huneke put Lowell Stack’s family doctor on the witness
stand, the homicide case against Replogle “fell to pieces.”21
Chapter Two has a good deal to say about Gideon v. Wainwright22 the
case and Gideon the person. But there are some problems.23
Houppert does note that although he wrote the majority opinion in
Gideon overruling Betts v. Brady,24 Justice Black “made no attempt to
suggest that the overruling was necessary due to legal and social shifts in
the two decades since Betts.”25 But she does not explain why.
It so happens that there is a well-known article, written by Professor
Jerold Israel only a few months after Gideon was decided, that spells out at
considerable length why Black wrote the Gideon opinion the way he did.26
(Although Ms. Houppert quotes from a number of other law review articles
throughout her book, she never refers to Professor Israel’s article.)
Justice Black had written a strong dissent in Betts.27 He believed Betts
was wrongly decided from the start.28 Therefore, when he wrote the
opinion overruling Betts, Black insisted that “the Court in Betts v. Brady
[had] made an abrupt break with its own well-considered precedents.”29 As
Professor Israel observes, this is a way of “depreciating the original

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
23. A minor one, but one that should be noted, is that Ms. Houppert says twice that Justice
Black dissented in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). HOUPPERT, supra note 5, at 72.
Black did not become a Supreme Court Justice until five years after the famous case was decided.
See ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK 267 (1994) (noting that Black’s first day at the Supreme
Court was October 4, 1937). However, he did dissent in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474 (1942),
the decision that Gideon overruled. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339.
24. 316 U.S. 455 (1942); see also Gideon, 372 U.S. at 336 (Black, J., majority opinion).
25. HOUPPERT, supra note 5, at 86.
26. Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The “Art” of Overruling, 1963 SUP. CT. REV.
211. Israel’s article has deservedly been called “a classic article on the art of overruling.”
Donald A. Dripps, Up from Gideon, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 113, 115 (2012). As Professor Israel
points out, in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Court noted the change in
the state of public schools since the ruling in the overruled case of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896). Israel, supra, at 220; see also Brown, 347 U.S. at 492–95. As Israel also notes, in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the
Court made it clear that it considered alternatives to the exclusionary rule, such as tort actions
against the offending police officer, inadequate. See Israel, supra, at 222; see also Mapp, 367
U.S. at 679.
27. See Betts, 316 U.S. at 474 (Black, J., dissenting).
28. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 188 (1964).
29. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
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significance of the rejected case. . . . The Court is placed in a position to
reject a precedent and at the same time claim adherence to stare decisis.”30
Ms. Houppert maintains that Bruce Jacob’s31 chances of prevailing in
the Supreme Court were significantly reduced when, only a few months
before Gideon was to be decided, Justice Frankfurter retired from the
Court.32 Houppert calls Frankfurter “a proponent of Betts” as well as a
“huge proponent of judicial restraint and the importance of precedent.”33
Justice Frankfurter did join the majority in the 1942 Betts case and
Justice Black did write a strong dissent in that case. But Anthony Lewis
suggests that the difference between the two Justices may have “come down
to a question of timing.”34 Frankfurter might have believed, for example,
that in the early 1940s the legal profession was unprepared for the burden of
providing counsel for indigents or that in those days some states would
have strongly resisted a Gideon-like decision.35
By the 1960s, according to Lewis, Justice Frankfurter might very well
have changed his mind.36 Indeed, Justice Black thought so. Lewis tells us
that Justice Black assured his fellow Justices that if Frankfurter had still
been on the Court in 1963 he would have voted to reverse Gideon’s
conviction and overrule Betts.37 Moreover, according to Lewis, when
Frankfurter learned that Black had told the other Justices that he would
have voted with them if he had still been on the Court, Frankfurter
responded: “Of course I would.”38
Although Ms. Houppert quotes from Lewis’s book on many other
occasions, she never mentions Lewis’s views on how (or why) Frankfurter
would have voted if he had still been on the Court when Gideon was
decided.

30. Israel, supra note 26, at 235. However, Israel makes it clear that he does not share Justice
Black’s view. He believes, rather, that a “close reading” of Powell v. Alabama is that it restricted
the duty to provide counsel for indigent defendants to special circumstances, such as illiterate
defendants. Id. at 236–37. In short, “Powell v. Alabama provided a steppingstone to either a Betts
or a Gideon, depending upon how far and fast the Court utilized the opinion’s potential for
expansion.” Id. at 238. I share Israel’s view.
31. Bruce Jacob represented the State of Florida when the Gideon case was argued in the U.S.
Supreme Court. LEWIS, supra note 28, at 139–40.
32. HOUPPERT, supra note 5, at 76.
33. Id.
34. LEWIS, supra note 28, at 221.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 221–22.
37. Id.
38. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). My understanding is that Frankfurter and Lewis
were fairly close. I assume that at some point Lewis heard what Justice Black had said about how
Justice Frankfurter would have voted in Gideon if he had still been on the Court and Lewis then
asked Frankfurter whether Black had been correct.
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A big chunk of Houppert’s second chapter consists of extracts from the
oral arguments in the Gideon case.39 It is not clear why. After all, in his
1964 book, Lewis sets forth virtually all of the same extracts from the oral
arguments that Houppert does.40 If anything, Lewis’s coverage is more
extensive than Houppert’s.
For example, Lewis makes it clearer than Houppert does how Alabama
Assistant Attorney General George Mentz irritated the Justices. (Mentz,
who had written an amicus brief on behalf of Alabama and North Carolina,
the only two states siding with Florida, had also been given some time to
argue the case.41) Consider the following exchanges (both omitted from
Houppert’s book):
Mentz: “. . . [P]rosecutors are more lenient with unrepresented
defendants . . . .”
Justice Stewart: “Isn’t that a matter of trial strategy? It might
backfire if the prosecutor were tough and the jury saw the defendant
there helpless. . . . All you’re saying is that the absence of counsel
impedes the adversary system of justice.”
Mentz: “I didn’t mean to go that far.”
Justice Stewart: “I’m sure you didn’t.”
...
Mentz: “In actuality, indigents without lawyers probably get off
easier. The average Alabama lawyer is not equipped to deal with the
career prosecutor. . . .”
...
Justice Douglas: “Maybe if laymen are as effective as you say, we
should get the Sixth Amendment repealed.”
Mentz: “Mr. Justice, I didn’t mean to go that far.”42
Those people who remember the Henry Fonda movie, Gideon’s
Trumpet (based on Anthony Lewis’s book of the same name), will be
surprised to learn that, according to Ms. Houppert, Mr. Gideon did not write
his petition for certiorari all by himself. Instead, Houppert tells us, Gideon
needed and obtained the services of a former lawyer and municipal judge,
Joseph A. Peel, Jr. After being convicted of murder, Peel was sentenced to
life imprisonment, winding up in the same prison where Gideon resided.43
Bruce Jacob represented the State of Florida when the Gideon case
was argued in the U.S. Supreme Court.44 Fred Turner represented
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See HOUPPERT, supra note 5, at 77–86.
See LEWIS, supra note 28, at 169–81.
Id. at 152–53, 178.
Id. at 179–80.
HOUPPERT, supra note 5, at 99–101.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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Mr. Gideon after his burglary conviction was reversed by the Supreme
Court, and he was tried for burglary a second time.45 According to
Houppert, Jacob and Turner became good friends.46 At this point, let
Houppert speak for herself:
[Jacob] says he and Turner had many conversations about [Mr.]
Gideon. “Fred Turner told me that Gideon told him [that a former
lawyer and municipal judge, Joseph Peel, who wound up in the same
prison as Gideon,] helped [Mr. Gideon] out,” Jacob recalls. . . .
Jacob went on to suggest that Peel not only helped prepare Gideon’s
writ, but masterminded the idea of not including any “special
circumstances” in it, so that the Supreme Court would be more
inclined to use the case as an excuse to reexamine Betts. [Jacob] also
cynically suggests that Peel may have retained Gideon’s misspellings
and grammatical errors to impress the [C]ourt with this determined
but unlettered man. In any case, there is little doubt that the colorful
Joseph Peel was an unrecognized character in the drama of Gideon—
in a way that both challenges and affirms the reasoning behind the
Supreme Court’s decision.47
I have no doubt that Bruce Jacob did accurately report what
Mr. Turner told him about Peel’s involvement in the Gideon case. I can’t
help wondering, however, whether Mr. Gideon did something that irritated
Mr. Turner and led Turner to exaggerate Peel’s role in Gideon.
Evidently, Mr. Gideon was a difficult person.
For example,
immediately after a long meeting with Mr. Gideon, shortly before the latter
was retried for burglary, a civil liberties lawyer names Tobias Simon said of
Mr. Gideon that his “maniacal distrust and suspicion lead him to the very
borders of insanity.”48 Houppert herself tells us that, shortly after Turner
agreed to represent Gideon on his retrial for burglary, Turner “sharply
reprimanded Gideon for meddling in the case, telling him, ‘I’ll only
represent you if you will stop trying to be the lawyer.’”49
From what we know about the former lawyer and judge who is said to
have helped out Mr. Gideon in his legal work, Joseph Peel did very few
good things in his colorful life. After being convicted of murder, Peel spent
more than twenty years in prison.50 Then he was paroled because he was
dying of cancer.51 (He died a few days after his release.52)

45. HOUPPERT, supra note 5, at 102.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. LEWIS, supra note 28, at 224, 227–28.
49. HOUPPERT, supra note 5, at 89 (quoting Bruce R. Jacob, Memories of and Reflections
about Gideon v. Wainwright, 33 STETSON L. REV. 181, 259 (2003)).
50. Joseph A. Peel Jr.; Had Murder Role, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1982, at 17, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/1982/07/05/obituaries/joseph-a-peel-jr-had-murder-role.html.
51. Id.
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When he was released, Peel agreed to be interviewed by a Florida
reporter and more or less admitted his involvement in the murder which led
to his life imprisonment.53 Peel knew he was dying. He knew, too, that this
was the reason he had been released from prison. It strikes me that this
would have been a propitious time for Peel to note that he had done a few
good things in his life, too—such as help the famous Mr. Gideon write his
petition for certiorari. But Peel never did say anything about that.
We are told very little about Joseph Peel. We know that he was a
divorce lawyer.54 We don’t even know whether he ever practiced criminal
law before he became a municipal judge. Nor do we know whether he ever
presided over criminal cases when he did become a municipal judge. Nor
do we have any idea whether Peel had any interest in constitutional law,
generally, or the right to counsel in particular.
Houppert points out that after Gideon was decided, thousands of
Florida prisoners sought new trials, and that Mr. Peel became so busy
assisting his fellow prisoners that “he was called the ‘jailhouse attorney.’”55
Arguably, therefore, even though he had not been a criminal lawyer
earlier in his career, one might say that Mr. Peel became a proficient lawyer
while he was in prison. (At least he did before he wound up in a maximum
security cell for practicing law in violation of prison rules.56)
However, what Mr. Peel did after Gideon was handed down in March
of 1963 has little or no bearing on whether he helped Mr. Gideon draft the
writ that arrived at the U.S. Supreme Court some fourteen months before
the Gideon case was decided.
According to Houppert, Mr. Peel wanted to impress the Supreme
Court with how “unlettered” Gideon was.57 If so, why did Peel write
Gideon’s petition in such a way (or allow Mr. Gideon to write it in such a
way) as to lead an assistant clerk of the Supreme Court, one of the first to
read the petition, to conclude that the person who wrote it “seemed likely”
to have worked from a copy of the Supreme Court rules?58 Was this the
best way to let Gideon show the Court how “unlettered” he was?
I submit that there is an astonishing story to tell about the Gideon case,
but one that does not involve Mr. Peel. It is a story first told by Lucas
Powe, Jr.,59 but one still not generally known.60 Because Powe is a
52. Id.
53. See Tim Pallesen, Peel Dies of Cancer Nine Days After Parole, MIAMI HERALD, at 1,
July 4, 1982.
54. HOUPPERT, supra note 5, at 100.
55. Id. at 101.
56. Id. at 101.
57. Id. at 102.
58. See LEWIS, supra note 28, at 5.
59. According to journalist Jim Newton, “Powe was the first to discover the intertwined
history” of Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), and Gideon v. Wainwright. JIM NEWTON,
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professor of government at the University of Texas, it seems fitting and
proper that I tell the story in the pages of the Texas Law Review.
There was another right-to-counsel case in the U.S. Supreme Court at
the time, one that the Court had focused on before it turned its attention to
Gideon. That other case, Douglas v. California,61 was eventually reargued
and decided on the same day as Gideon. The Douglas case raised the
question of whether an indigent person had the right to counsel on appeal,
the first appeal as of right.62
To understand Douglas, it is helpful to start with the 1956 case of
Griffin v. Illinois.63 In this case, the Court held that under certain
circumstances indigent appellants, those who could not afford to pay for a
trial transcript on their first appeal as of right, had to be provided one at
state expense.64 There was no opinion of the Court. Speaking for four
members of the Court, Black wrote a stirring opinion, observing: “There
can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as
adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy
transcripts.”65
Not surprisingly, the lawyers for Mr. Douglas relied heavily on
Black’s language in Griffin.66 But these lawyers probably had no idea that
they had prevailed before their case was ever reargued. As Professor Powe
has revealed,67 and as the personal papers of Justices Clark and Douglas
disclose,68 at a 1962 conference, a majority of the Justices agreed that an
indigent defendant did indeed have a right to counsel on the first appeal.
That a majority of the Court reached agreement in 1962 about how
Douglas should be decided affected Gideon as well. By deciding Douglas,
the Court, in effect, also decided Gideon.69 As Chief Justice Warren

JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 568 n.73 (2006); see also
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 379–86 (2000).
60. For example, there is no mention of this story in the leading treatise on criminal
procedure, the seven-volume work coauthored by Professor Wayne R. LaFave and several others.
61. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
62. Id. at 355.
63. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
64. Id. at 19–20.
65. Id. at 19. Black’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and
Clark. Id. at 13.
66. See Brief for Petitioners at 13–21, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (No. 34).
67. POWE, supra note 59, at 384.
68. See id. at 383 & 527 n.7, 384 & 528 nn.7–8 (indicating that Professor Powe cited and
drew from the personal papers of Justices Clark and Douglas in presenting the revelation that
Douglas was essentially decided before the case was reargued).
69. Id. at 384.
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observed at the 1962 meeting: “[W]e can’t say [an indigent person] must
have a lawyer on appeal and [yet] be denied one at trial.”70
As surprising as it may seem, when the Court met in conference for the
last time in late June, a majority of the Justices (perhaps all of them) agreed
that “Fortas [who had just been appointed to represent Mr. Gideon] should
have the privilege of arguing the case that interred Betts rather than arguing
a pro forma case after Douglas.”71
Chapter 3 (called “A Perfect Storm: Looking for Justice in New
Orleans”) deals largely with the killing of fifteen-year-old Elliot Porter72
and the wrongful conviction of two young men for this crime.73 One
witness insisted that she saw the two defendants walking with the deceased
on the night of the shooting and then chasing him.74 She also claimed she
heard shots shortly thereafter.75 The witness was Sheila Robertson.76 The
two young men prosecuted for, and convicted of, the murder were Gregory
Bright and Earl Truvia.77
Thanks to the excellent work of a new lawyer on the case, Emily
Bolton (the director of the newly established Innocence Project New
Orleans), the case for the prosecution was eventually demolished and the
two convicted men were finally released from prison. Unfortunately, it
took a staggering twenty-seven years to bring this about.78
The key witness for the prosecution—indeed, the only witness—was
Ms. Robertson. She claimed that at about 1 a.m. on the night of the
shooting she was sitting at her window, waiting for her boyfriend, when she
saw Elliot Porter break away from the two men accompanying him and
crawl through a nearby fence. Then she heard shots. Ms. Robertson
subsequently identified the two defendants as the two men she saw that
night.79
Ms. Robertson told the police what she saw. Then she told the grand
jury. Finally, she testified at the trial. But major aspects of her version of
the events kept changing.
First, she claimed that on the night of the shooting the two defendants
warned her not to tell the police what she had seen. Then she told the grand

70. Id. at 383.
71. Id. at 384; see also NEWTON, supra note 59 (maintaining that having “secured Fortas to
argue Gideon as the landmark case,” the Justices “did not then want to steal his thunder by
announcing Douglas first”).
72. HOUPPERT, supra note 5, at 105.
73. Id. at 109–10.
74. Id. at 108.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 108–09.
77. Id. at 109.
78. Id. at 160–61, 174–75.
79. Id. at 108–09, 116–19.
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jury that a couple of nights after the shooting the defendants warned her not
to tell the police. At the trial, Ms. Robertson testified—and this was the
first time a gun was ever mentioned—that one of the defendants held a
pistol to her young child’s head when he “reminded” Ms. Robertson not to
contact the police.80
Unfortunately, the defense had no idea that this was the first time
Ms. Robertson had ever mentioned a gun because the defense had never
seen any previous statements by the witness.81
Public defender Robert Zibilich had been appointed to represent
Gregory Bright. (Zibilich was a private attorney who represented his
indigent clients as a public defender “while juggling his paying clients.”82
All the public defenders in New Orleans operated this way.83)
Without calling a single witness, Zibilich concluded the murder trial in
less than two hours. None of defendant Bright’s eight subpoenaed
witnesses, several of them alibi witnesses, were ever called to testify.
According to Mr. Bright, his attorney told him he was not going to call any
witnesses because he thought doing so would “aggravate the jury,” who
were already tired and upset that the trial was taking so long.84 (Taking so
long? The trial took less than two hours.)
Gregory Bright’s first lawyer had never looked at the crime scene
(which was only a quarter of a mile down the road from the courthouse).
But that was the first thing Mr. Bright’s new lawyer, Emily Bolton, did.85
She soon realized that
there was no way the state’s primary witness could have seen what
she described taking place on the sidewalk, no way she could have
seen the hole in the fence, no way she could have seen [the victim of
the shooting] where she said she did. Beneath Sheila Robertson’s
third-story bedroom window was a porch roof that completely
obstructed her view of the sidewalk.86
And that is not all. Ms. Robertson had testified that she could see
“pretty good” the night of the shooting because she had “the bathroom,
kitchen, and hall lights on.”87 However, the kitchen and the bathroom were
on the floor below the bedroom.88

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 117, 137.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 120.
Id.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 163.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Why would Sheila Robertson lie? Ms. Bolton discovered that the state
witness’s name was not Sheila Robertson, but Sheila Caston—and that
Sheila Caston had been arrested for, inter alia, forgery, prostitution, drug
possession, and distribution. After getting a court order for Caston’s
hospital records (and those under her alias, Robertson), Bolton learned that
the only witness for the prosecution was a “paranoid schizophrenic” who
had been “experiencing hallucinations at the time of the [Elliot Porter]
murder.”89
I have pointed to so many weaknesses in the prosecution’s case against
Gregory Bright and Earl Truvia that it is hard to believe there are any more.
But there are. When Ms. Bolton spoke with the original forensic
pathologist about the time of death, he insisted it had to be between 5 a.m.
and 8 a.m. According to the pathologist, there was “no way [Elliot Porter]
could have been killed at 1:30 a.m. as Sheila had testified.”90
Once again, as we saw in the first chapter of Ms. Houppert’s book, the
third chapter illustrates the great distance between a first-class lawyer and
an inadequate one. But is the enormous caseload public defenders must
work with making it increasingly difficult for even first-class lawyers to
make a difference? On this point, Ms. Houppert is understandably quite
pessimistic:
Greg Bright was finally released from prison on June 23, 2003,
thanks to the herculean efforts of a team of lawyers who, working for
a tiny nonprofit, randomly stumbled on his case and agreed to work
his appeal. According to the parameters established by Gideon, he
had been given a lawyer for his initial trial. But regardless of how
ineffective his counsel was, he had no right to an attorney to
represent him in most of the complicated legal processes that
followed. The fact that there was no possible way for him to do the
legwork necessary to investigate the case—visit the crime scene,
interview witnesses, secure documents, obtain witness rap sheets,
consult psychiatric experts—is considered inconsequential by the
government. Making matters worse, Louisiana joins Michigan,
Arkansas, and Washington in limiting felons’ access to public
records, including police reports and DA files.91
Chapter 4 is largely about Georgia’s successful effort (a) to convict
Rodney Young of the murder of his ex-girlfriend’s twenty-eight-year-old
son, Gary Jones, and (b) to sentence the murderer to death.92 It is also the
story of Joseph Romond (the lead defense lawyer), who is trying his first

89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 164–65.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 181–83, 229, 247.
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death penalty case.93 (Unfortunately, Romond is “also juggling eight other
death penalty cases at the same time.”94)
Romond is well aware that Georgia is the only state in the nation that
requires evidence “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the murderer is
mentally retarded in order for a capital defendant convicted of murder to be
spared the death penalty.95 He is even more aware that there has never been
a jury trial in the history of Georgia when a jury concluded that a defendant
was guilty of a capital offense but found him mentally retarded.96
It does not help defense lawyer Romond that the murder was
especially brutal. As Houppert describes the body of the murder victim—
and this is just one of many examples of her robust writing—“[t]he buttondown oxford that clothes the corpse is so drenched in deep red blood that it
is impossible to detect what color it might have once been.”97 Nor does it
help the defense that the jury is more likely to identify with the victim of
the murder than it would in the ordinary case because the victim of this
murder “was on his way home from church, still in his church clothes”
when he was killed, something the prosecution repeatedly told the jury.98
There is a good deal of interesting material in this chapter. We are told
that in many parts of the country, African-Americans are greatly
underrepresented on juries.99 (One probable reason is that AfricanAmericans are struck from juries at three times the rate of whites.100) To
put it another way, “racially biased peremptory strikes” have taken their
toll.101 Lawyers “can exclude a juror based on the vaguest of reasons—not
the brightest bulb in the pack, too strident, wears a cross necklace, wears a
nose ring, wears pearls, wears patchouli oil[, etc.] . . . .”102
Houppert has studied the speeches and writings of such well-respected
commentators as Stephen Bright (founder and director of Atlanta’s
Southern Center for Human Rights) and Scott Sundby (a law professor who
has interviewed hundreds of jurors after their deliberations in capital cases).
She has also personally interviewed Professor Sundby.
Bright “explains the clamor for death as something elected officials—
politicians, of course, but also elected judges—have generated themselves,
fighting a fear of being perceived as ‘soft on crime.’”103 Sundby

93. Id. at 186.
94. Id. at 212–13.
95. See id. at 184.
96. Id. at 227.
97. Id. at 185.
98. Id. at 232 (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. Id. at 215.
100. Id. at 215–16.
101. Id. at 215.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 217.
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emphasizes that the presence or absence of African-American males on
juries really matters: “‘If you have one African American male juror, the
chances of the defendant getting a death sentence go down 40 percent,’ says
Scott Sundby. . . . [‘I]f you have five white males on the jury, the chances
of death go up 40 percent.’”104 But Houppert continues:
[Sometimes] the most powerful voices for death can [also] be
African Americans, Sundby says . . . . “If the African American
defendant’s life really parallels that of an African American juror,
growing up in this same neighborhood with gangs, and he is looking
at this life of violence that led to killing, that juror could go, “‘Hey,
that was me and I didn’t end up doing that!’”105
The reader of this chapter learns about the philosophy of group
decision making generally and, more specifically, about such matters as the
Allen charge106 (sometimes called the “dynamite charge”) when the jury
appears to be deadlocked.107 The reader also learns why “the holdout juror”
usually winds up “capitulat[ing] to the majority.”108
What does any of this have to do with the sorry condition of indigent
defense fifty years after Gideon?
To use the author’s own words, Chasing Gideon is supposed to be a
book about how—quite possibly because “no one can generate the political
will necessary to change things”—“equal justice for all [still] eludes us.”109
But Chapter 4 is primarily about the administration of the death penalty. It
belongs in a book about capital punishment, not one about the sorry state of
indigent defense today.
No doubt Ms. Houppert would disagree with me. In her introduction,
she suggests that the Rodney Young case is one where “valiant but
underfunded defenders” were overwhelmed, and she observes that
“disparate funding levels for prosecutors and public defenders can tip the
balance between life and death.”110
No doubt that has happened too many times because, as Professor
Peter Arenella has observed, the “resource imbalance” between the state
and the defense lawyer is “particularly egregious in death penalty
prosecutions.”111 Continues Arenella:

104.
105.
106.
(1896).
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 220.
Id. at 221.
The so-called Allen charge was developed from Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492
HOUPPERT, supra note 5, at 244.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 252.
Id. at x.
Peter Arenella, Foreword: O.J. Lessons, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1235 (1996).
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Given the horrific nature of [many death penalty cases], the
defendant’s life often depends on the defense’s ability and capacity
to make the client’s humanity apparent to the jury deciding his fate at
the sentencing phase of the trial. Far too often, underpaid defense
lawyers in capital cases spend less time and effort on death penalty
cases than the [O.J.] Simpson defense team expended prepping for
his preliminary hearing.112
I very much doubt, however, that the case Houppert concentrates on,
the Rodney Young case, was one of those times when the “resource
imbalance” between the prosecution and the defense was the basis for the
death penalty. I believe that Houppert’s own account of the case establishes
that much.
Twelve former teachers, coaches, and guidance counselors testified on
Mr. Young’s behalf. They testified he was in special education classes
throughout high school which meant he had an IQ under 70. (However, in
precomputer days, records were thrown out after seven years. Therefore,
there was nothing on paper which proved definitively that his IQ was
below 70.)113
A social worker at Mr. Young’s school, who had grown up in the same
neighborhood with him, also told the jury about “the rough and violent
neighborhood they lived in.”114 The social worker opposed the death
penalty for Mr. Young because he believed the defendant could still be
rehabilitated.115
Finally, the defendant’s sixteen-year-old daughter testified on the
defendant’s behalf. She pleaded with the jury not to “kill my dad.”116
There were undoubtedly a number of reasons that led the jury to
convict Mr. Young of murder and sentence him to death. Among them
were:
(1) Although the defendant never admitted he committed the murder,
the evidence that he did so was “[o]verwhelming”;117
(2) prosecutors maintained that the defendant murdered his exgirlfriend’s son “in order to . . . scare her back into his arms by
making her think that roving, violent gangs were out to get her”118—
an especially cold-blooded reason to kill someone;

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
HOUPPERT, supra note 5, at 208–09.
Id. at 239.
Id.
Id. at 240–41.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 183.
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(3) the defendant received a football scholarship to attend college,
something hard to reconcile with being mentally retarded;119
(4) the defendant held a job (although it was only putting labels on
cans);120 he “lived more or less on his own, [and] moved through the
world like the rest of us”;121
(5) after repeatedly being punched and kicked, another ex-girlfriend
requested a restraining order against the defendant;122 and
(6) as previously mentioned, the jury probably empathized with the
murder victim because the victim “was just minding his own
business”; indeed, the victim had just come home from church.123
I venture to say that, considering the prosecution’s strong case against
Mr. Rodney Young, even someone wealthy enough to pay for his own
lawyer probably would have been convicted of murder and sentenced to
death.
A final comment. In recent years, there has been a good deal of talk
about “civil Gideon,” “a shorthand for the idea that the right to appointed
counsel for indigent criminal defendants recognized in Gideon should be
extended to civil cases involving interests of a sufficient magnitude,”124
e.g., child custody, housing, and domestic abuse cases. Ms. Houppert
should have discussed this notion—even if she ultimately rejected it. At
this point, the best argument against “civil Gideon” is probably the sorry
state of “criminal Gideon”125—a condition vividly illustrated throughout
Ms. Houppert’s book.

119. Id. at 209–10, 224.
120. Id. at 191.
121. Id. at 208.
122. Id. at 237.
123. Id. at 232.
124. Rebecca Aviel, Why Civil Gideon Won’t Fix Family Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2106, 2108
(2013). See generally Symposium, Toward a Civil Gideon: The Future of American Legal
Services, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2013). The Supreme Court touched upon this issue but did
not resolve it in Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011), where the noncustodial parent
was found to be in civil contempt of court for failing to make child support payments and
sentenced to prison for one year. Id. at 2512–14.
125. Lawrence J. Siskind, Civil Gideon: An Idea Whose Time Should Not Come, AM.
THINKER, Aug. 6, 2011, http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/08/civil_gideon_an_idea_whose_
time_should_not_come.html.

